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Abstract
Honeypots has emerged to become a great tool for
administrator to track down the Intruder, prevent attack
by intruder and log all the activity done by the intruder.
In this paper, we will look into dffirent type of
Honeypots such as KFSensor, Specter, Honeyd and
Honeynets. Compare the strength and the weakness of
each Honeypots. We will discuss on how to implement a
simple Honeypots. This paper will also look into the
Dynamic Honeypots and the possible solution for
Dynamic Honeypots that need minimum configuration
from network administrator.
1. Introduction
Due to emerge of the internet and everyone are link
together by network. The security and privacy of each
local network or each user become more and more
important issue. Administrator may use different kind of
security tools and hardware to protect his own network
such as Firewalls, Sniffer and many others that available
in the market.
One of the solutions for the network security could be
Honeypots (see Figure l). It is the concept that
introduced by several people in computer security,
especially Bill Cheswick's [1] paper "An Evening with
Berferd" and Cliff Stoll [2] in the book "The Cuckoo's
Egg". After that, Honeypots has continued to evolved
and develop to a powerful network security tools as it is
today.
2. Value of Honeypots
We have two general categories of honeypots;
honeypots can either be used for production purposes or
research.
When honeypots is used for production purposes,
honeypots are protecting an organization. This would
include preventing, detecting, or helping organizations
respond to an attack. When honeypots is used for
research pulposes, honeypots are being used to collect
information of the attack. This information has different
value and it is vary for each organizations. Some
organization might want to be studying hends or
behavior in attacker activity, while the others are
interested in early detection, warning and prediction, or
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Iaw enforcement. Generally, high-interaction honeypots
are often used for research pulposes, while the low-
interaction honeypots are used for production purposes.














Figure 1: Example of Honeynet (2'o Generation)
Architecture
When the Honeypots is used for production pu{poses,
it can protect the organizations in one of three ways:
Prevention, Detection, and Response to attack. Now we
will look in more detail on how a honeypots can work in
all three ways. Honeypots is capable to prevent attacks
in many ways. The first way is against automated
attacks, such as auto-rooters or worrns. All these attacks
are based on tools that is randomly scan entire networks
and looking for vulnerable systems. If the vulnerable
systems are found, these automated tools will then
launch the attack and try to take over the system while
the worms will self-replicating, copying themselves to
the victim. The honeypots can help to defend against
such attacks by slowing down their scanning down,
potentially even stopping all these threat. It is called
sticky honeypots, these solutions will monitor unused IP
space. When it found a probed by such scanning
activity, these honeypots will interact with attack and
slow the attacker down. They do this using a variety of
TCP tricks, such as a Windows size of zero, putting the
attacker into a holding pattern. [3] This is excellent
solution for slowing down or preventing the spread of a
worm that has penetrated into the intemal organization.
One such example of a sticky honeypot is LaBrea Tarpit
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[6]. Sticky honeypots are most often low-interaction
solutions. It is a'no-interaction solutions', as they slow
the attacker down to a crawl. Honeypots can also protect
your organization from human attackers by using the
concept of deception or deterrence. The main idea is to
confuse the attacker, and make him waste his time and
resources interacting with the honeypots. Meanwhile, we
can detect the attacker's activity and has the time to
respond or stop the attacker's attack. It can be even more
interesting when an attacker knows your organization is
using honeypots, but does not know which systems are
honeypots and which systems are legitimate computers.
They may decide not to attack your system because
afraid about being caught by honeypots. Thus the
honeypot deters the attacker. The example of a
honeypots that designed to do this is Deception Toolkit,
a low-interaction honeypot.
Detection is the second way honeypots can help to
protect an organization. Detection is critical; the
honeypots purpose is to identify a failure or breakdown
in prevention system. No matter of how secure an
organization is, there will always be failures. There are
always humans that involved in the process. By using an
efficient detection tools to detect an attacker, we can
quickly response to their attack, stopping or mitigating
the damage they did to the organization. From the
history shows, it is extremely difficult to do a good
detection. Technologies such as Inkusion Detection
System sensors and systems logs haven proved
ineffective for some reasons. Intrusion Detection system
often generates far too much data, a very large
percentage of false alarms that will confuse the
administrator, inability to detect new attacks, and it is
unable to work in encrypted or IPv6 environments.
Honeypots perform very well in detection purpose; it
addresses many of these problems of traditional
detections. Honeypots reduce false alarm by capturing
small data sets with high value, it also able to capture
unknown attacks such as new exploits tactics or
polymorphic shellcode, and honeypot also can work in
encrypted and IPv6 environments. Generally, low-
interaction honeypots such as KFSensor make good
solutions for detection. They are easier to deploy and
maintain compare to high-interaction honeypots that
need complex configuration and risk.
The final way a honeypot can help in protecting an
organization is through response to attack. When an
organization has detected a failure or a security breach,
how do they respond? It is often be one of the greatest
challenges faced by the organization. There is always
lack of useful information such as who are the attacker,
how did they get in, and how much damage they have
done to the organization. In the situations like this,
detailed information on the attacker's activity is very
critical. There are two problems compounding to
incidence response. First, often the affected systems
compromised cannot be taken offline to analyze the root
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cause and the damage done by the attacker. Production
systems, such as an organization's mail server, that it is
so critical that even though it's been hacked, and
security administrator may not be able to take the system
down and do a proper forensic analysis. Instead, they are
limited to analyze the live system while still providing
production services. This will affect the ability to
analyze what is happening, how much damage the
attacker has done, and even if the attacker has broken
into other related systems. The other problem is even if
the system is pulled off-line, there is too much data. The
security professional will have difficulty to determine
what the bad guy did. If the data is polluted with others
information such as user's logging in, mail accounts
read, files written to databases and etc. It will be very
difficult to determine what is normal day-to-day activity,
and what is activity done by the attacker.
Honeypots could be very helpful in addressing both
problems. Honeypots can be an excellent incident
response tool, as they can quickly and easily taken
offline for a fulI forensic analysis and further analysis,
without impacting day-to-day business operations of the
organization. Also, the honeypot only captures
unauthorized or malicious activity done to it. These will
makes hacked honeypots much more easy to analyze
then hacked production systems, as any data we retrieve
from a honeypot is most likely to be related to the
attacker. The value honeypots provide here is quickly
giving organizations the in-depth information of the
attacker that they need to rapidly and effectively respond
to the incident. Generally, high-interaction honeypots is
the best solution for response to the attack. In order for
us to respond to an intruder, we need in-depth
knowledge on what the attacker did, how they broke in,
and what are the tools they used. For this kind of
information we most likely need the capabilities of a
high-interaction honeypot such as HoneyNets.
3. Dynamic Honeynet
3.1. Comparison of Static Honeypot and
Dynamic Honeypot
The main issue with all the network security
technologies including Honeypot is to configure them.
Anything in the network security technologies from a
simple router to firewall rules require a human to
analyze the environment and problem, and then come up
with a solution to configure and implement the best
solution. But, the work is not done there. Once we have
implemented the technology, we have deployed, it need
our daily attention and resources.
The current static Honeypots face the same issue,
regardless of what type of honeypot you are building.
From something as complex as Honeynets to something
as simple as KFSensor, configuration is still required.
With current honeypots, one of the configuration issues
is where will the honeypot sit at? Which Operating
System will host the honeypot and what are the
environments that we want the honeypot to emulate, will
it be Solaris system, Linux, Windows, or maybe Cisco
IOS? We might want to ensure we are emulating the
same operating systems that are deployed within your
organization, so the honeypots can easily blend into our
environment. After we have determined the Operating
System, there come some questions like what are the
services do we want to run: is it web, email, or perhaps
file sharing? Failing to run the correct services means
missed probed or attacks. However, monitoring the
wrong services can be just as harmful, as the wrong
service can be a dead give away for a honeypot. If we
are having a Linux honeypot emulate SubT or NetBus
services, then it would look quite odd. Or we are having
a Windows honeypot that emulate the sadmind, dtscpd,
or rpc.statd service would also have a wired appearance
about it. As such, we have to make sure the correct
honeypots are running relevant services. Also, the issue
becomes ofwhere do we deploy our honeypot, and how
many do we need?
As if configuring and deploying was not enough,
someone has to maintain the honeypots once they go live
and it can be more challenging then it sounds. It is not
only is honeypot technologies that rapidly developing
and changing that require updates for our honeypots but
also the organization networks. New systems such as the
Iatest Linux server are constantly being added into the
network while old systems such as that Novell NetWare
server still running IPX were removed or upgraded, The
old system such Gopher or Telnet may be phased out
while new applications like Instant Messaging, P2P, or
live video was introduced. The organization and
networks are constantly changing. To stay current, the
honeypots have to adapt to the changes. Traditionally,
this means someone (Honeypots administrator) need to
manually updating or modi$ing the honeypots to better
mirror the real production environment. That means it
cost time, money, and sometime mistakes do happen.
That's why the idea of the Dlmamic Honeypots
comes out. It is just a plug-n-play solution. We can
simply plug it into the network and the honeypot does all
the work for us. Dynamics Honeypots will automatically
determines how many honeypots need to deploy, how to
deploy them, and what they should look like so that they
can blend in with the organization environment. Even
better, the deployed honeypots can change and adapt to
the organization environment. When we add Linux to
the network, we suddenly have Linux honeypots. If we
remove a Novell server from organization network, the
Novell honeypots automatically disappear. When we
replace our Juniper routers with a Cisco IOS, and our
honeypot routers will change. The ultimate goal is an
appliance, a solution where we just simply plug into our
network, it will learn the environment, deploys the
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proper number and configuration ofhoneypots, and most
important is adapts to any changes in our networks.
Sound like a great magic but the technology is there.
What we need is just have to put all of them together.
3.2. Ways to make Dynamics Honeypot
The most critical part of a dynamic honeypot is how
the Dynamic Honeypots learns about our network. what
systems our organization using and how these systems
are being used. With this knowledge, the dynamic
honeypot can intelligently map and respond to our
environment. One possible approach is to actively probe
the organization network, determine what systems are
live, types of systems they are, and what kind of services
they are using. Nmap is one such scanning tool with that
capable to do all mentioned activities. However, there
are some drawbacks to such an active method. Firstly, it
will inffoduce more activities to our networks. h nor
only affecting the network bandwidth or network
activity, but with the scanning process it can cause
services, even entire systems to shutdown. Other than
that, it is possible to miss a system, as the system may be
firewalled. The probes are sent to the system, but
nothing is retumed. The third drawback will be an active
scanning takes only a snapshot of a point of time; it
cannot give is the real-time changes update. We would
constantly need to scan our environment to get the latest
update of the system. That's why it's not a very elegant
approach.
The idea is relatively simple, to map and identi!'
systems on your network and it do not actively probe the
systems, instead it passively capture network activity,
analyze that activity, and then determine the system's
identity. This technology uses the same approach as
active scanning. Scanning Tools such as Nmap will
build a database of known operating systems and
services. These tools will then actively send packets to
the target, packets which illicit a response. These
responses which are unique to most operating systems
and services are then compared with the database of
known signatures to identify the operating system and
services of the remote system.
Passive fingerprinting also takes the same approach; it
has a database ofknown signatures for specific systems.
However, the data is taken passively. Instead of actively
probing the remote systems, the passive fingerprinting
sniff traffic from the network and analyzes the packets
from that network. Then, it will compare the packets
against a database of signatures to identify the remote
system and also the services. Passive fingerprinting is
not just limited to TCP, it can also be used in other
protocols. Passive technologies have several advantages.
First it's not intrusive. It is passively gathering data
rather than actively interacting with systems. This will
reduce the network bandwidth and network traffic or
damaging or taking down a system or service in the
network. Second, although the systems are using host-
based firewalls, passive fingerprinting will still be able
to identifu the system, if nothing else then it will map a
MAC address to an IP. Lastly, this method is continuous
-- as organization networks changes, these changes can
be captured in real time and this becomes critical for
maintaining realistic honeypots over the long term. But
we do have some disadvantage of passive mapping, it
may not work well across routed networks; it's more
effective on organization local LAN. In some cases,
more then just one dynamic honeypot would have to be
physically deployed in the organization, depending on
the organization size, number of networks, and
configuration.
The dynamic honeypot could leverage this concept of
passive fingerprinting to leam our networks. The
honeypot could be deployed as an appliance or single
box. This device is then physically connected to your
network. Once connected, it spends the some time
watching and learning the organization network. By
passively analyzing all of the traffic it sees, it will then
determine how many systems are on your networks,
what are the operating system types, the kind of the
services they offer, and potentially even which systems
are communicating with whom and how often is it. All
these information is then used to learn and map the
organization network. Once the honeypot learns the
environment, it can begin deploying more honeypots.
The strong point of the Dynamics Honeypots here is that
the honeypots are crafted to mirror your environment.
And by appear and behaving the same way as the
organization production environment, the honeypots
seamlessly blend in, making them much more difficult
for attackers to identif as honeypots. Moreover, this
passive learning does not stop there. It continuously
monitors ttre organization network and whenever it
found a change, this change is identified and the
deployed honeypots will adapt to the changes. If the
organization is a typical Windows environment, we may
begin deploying some Linux servers. Then the dynamic
honeypot, using passive fingerprinting, can determine
that Linux systems have been deployed and the
honeypot would then deploy Linux honeypots, or update
existing honeypots, based on the same Linux makeup
and using similar services. The dynamic honeypot vastly
reduces not only the work involved in configuring your
honeypots, but also maintains them in a constantly
changing environment. All this will save up a lot of cost.
The next problem related to Dynamics Honeypots to
be solved is how do the honeypots get deployed? As we
discussed, passive fingerprinting offers a powerful tool,
but how do we can actually get it to populate into the
network with honeypots? Traditionally, this need
physically deploying a new computer for each IP
address we wanted to monitor. However, this has defeats
the purpose of a dynamic honeypot if we still need a
person to physically deploy multiple honeypots. What
we need is a hands free, fire-and-forget solution. A far
more simple and effective approach is not to deploy any
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physical honeypots. We try to deploy virtual honeypotsin our network. All of these virhral honeypots are
deployed and maintained by our appliance, our single
physical device. The virtual honeypots monitor only
unused IP space, so we can be highly confident that any
activity to or from those IPs is most likely malicious or
unauthorized behavior. Based on our previous
discussion about the passive mapping of the network, we
can determine how many honeypots we should deploy,
what the types are, and where to deploy. Our honeypots
now match the type of production systems in use and
their services, but also the ratio of systems used. Other
than that, the virtual honeypots can also monitor the
same IP space as the systems themselves. Just for
example, the honeypot learns that the Windows Xp
workstations are DHCP systems in the 192.168.1.100 -
192.168.1.250 range. Then the Windows Xp honeypots
would reside in the same IP space, while the other
honeypots are monitored their respective IP space.
Once again, this ability to dynamically create and
deploy virtual honeypots already exists. The Open-
Source honeypot like Honeyd allows users to deploy
virtual honeypots throughout an organization. In
addition, this honeypot can also emulate over 500
operating systems, both at the IP stack and application
level. As an Open-Source solution, it's highly
customizable, allowing it to adapt to almost any
environment. By combining the abilities of a solution
like Honeyd, with the capabilities of a passive
fingerprinting tool, we come very close to an ideal
dynamic honeypot. We can have a hands free, fire-and-
forget solution. We just deploy Honeyd honeypot by
connecting it to your network. The passive
fingerprinting tool will kicks in, passively monitoring
and mapping the organization network. After sometime,
it learns what systems our have, what services they are
running, where do they located, and may be how they
are being used. Based on this data, our honeypot will
create virtual honeypots that mirror the makeup of the
organization network, and subtly blend in with our
production systems. Attackers can no longer tell which
one is the honeypot and what is really part of your
network. Once these honeypots are virhrally deployed, it
will continue to monitor your networks. The virtual
honeypots adapt in real time to any additions, changes,
or removal of existing systems. The security
administrator just needs to sit back and catch the bad
guys (attacker).
Dynamic honeypots can radically revolutionize the
deployment and maintenance of honeypots. With the
abilities of leaming and monitoring the organization
networks in real time, they become a fire-and-forget
solution. Not only do they become cost-effective to
deploy and maintain, but they have better integration
into the organization network.
4. Conclusions and Future Works
Information becomes more and more important to every
organization and the emerged to be a competitive
advantage. And the information security also becomes
the main priority for the security professional. There are
many technologies that provide this kind of abilities such
as Intrusion detection system, Firewall and other securitv
measures. But all these tools often give us too many
information that need us to dig the useful information
from a few gigabytes data a day.
Honeypots come in to help us in three ways that is
prevention, detection and how we react to an attack.
There are two general types ofhoneypots which is Low
interaction honeypots such as Honeyd, Specter and
KFSensor. The highly interactive honeypots is like
Honeynet. Honeypots basically is sit on an unused Ip
where any attempt connection to that Ip will consider as
an authorized and malicious attack. This will help to
reduce the size of the information logged and the
security professional can easy detect an intrusion and
can response to it more effectively and fast.
Although the current technologies have the abilities to
perform an ideal Dynamics Honeypots they really do not
need any configuration from the system administrator. It
will have the abilities of learning and monitoring the
organization networks in real time and then deolov a
virhral honeypots that will suite the organization
environment.
The future task is to combine all the technologies to
come out with an ideal Dynamics honeypot that will
have its own intelligent and continuously change to
mirror the achral production network. The future
honeypots will become more cost effective to deploy and
maintain and also better integration into the organization
network.
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